

# Wileman's Review

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## NOTICE.

We beg to advise subscribers that the paragraph that appeared in the "Varias" of the "Jornal do Commercio" of Sunday in no way affects the delivery, as usual, of correspondence addressed to self or to my Review at P.O.B. 1521.

## AGENTS:—

Rio de Janeiro—

Crashley & C., Rua do Ouvidor, No. 38.

São Paulo—

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## MAIL FIXTURES

### FOR EUROPE.

- Feb. 17.—ALCANTARA, Royal Mail, for Liverpool  
" 17.—GUADELOUPE, Sud-Atlantique, for Bordeaux  
" 19.—DARRO, Royal Mail, for Liverpool  
" 26.—DESEADO, Royal Mail, for Liverpool

### FOR RIVER PLATE AND PACIFIC.

- Feb. 22.—DESNA, Royal Mail, for River Plate  
Mar. 9.—ORITA, P.S.N.C., for River Plate and Pacific

### FOR THE UNITED STATES.

- Feb. 23.—VASARI, Lamport and Holt, for New York

## " WILEMAN'S REVIEW."

In consequence of an injunction prohibiting my use of the title under which the first number of this journal was issued, viz., "The New Brazilian Review," which, it is claimed, is an infringement of author's rights, registered only ONE day before the appearance of my first issue, I have determined to change the title to that of "Wileman's Review," until I shall have succeeded in revindicating my right to the original title.

The case is simply an outrageous attempt at blackmail, as judicial investigation will establish.

To reassure intending subscribers, I beg them to take notice that subscriptions will fall due half-yearly, i.e., on 1st July, 1915, and 1st January, 1916, respectively.

J. P. WILEMAN.

February 16th, 1915.

## NOTES

To Germans it matters little, in fact, nothing at all, that the projected blockade of British waters should be against all the rules of maritime warfare.

Submarines cannot fight submarines, but the British navy and British people can and will find a way to defend their rights at all costs even if it comes to "digging the German navy like rats out of a hole," which may not be so far off as generally imagined!

Bombardment of defenceless watering places, the massacre of women and children by bombs, and now threats of torpedoing steamers like the "Lusitania," freighted with harmless and neutral passengers, has filled to the brim the cup of German misdoings.

But far from intimidating, such threats only serve to show Germany's desperation and to confirm Englishmen in their resolution to resist to the end the domination of a country so absolutely incapable of comprehending moral principles.

Modern submarines have now a range of thousands of miles, sufficient to steam right round England and, as an American contemporary puts it, to even cross the Atlantic and "blow in the gates of the New York docks."

No doubt we shall have losses and English feelings will be harrowed by such wanton waste of life, but whatever it costs we have to see it through and fight the good fight to a finish.

For some time Germans have been manoeuvring for the purchase by the United States Government of the large number of German steamers, now eating their heads off in American harbours, and their utilisation in the trade between the United States and Germany.

It is imagined that once the property of the United States they would be respected by Great Britain and that in this manner the blockade by the British of German ports might be flouted.

That the American Government would, under any circumstances, lend itself to such a manoeuvre is incredible in the face of the formal declaration of Great Britain, France and Russia that they will not recognise transfer of German steamers to neutral powers posterior to the declaration of war.

Cost what it may, the Allies are determined to maintain the blockade of German ports, as the seizure of the cargo of foodstuffs of the "Wilhelmina", bound from the United States to Hamburg and Bremen conclusively shows.

According to international law, foodstuffs intended for civil consumption do not constitute contraband; but in the impossibility of determining whether such consignments may not be utilised for military purposes, they are now classed by Great Britain as conditional contraband.

The voyage of the "Wilhelmina" in fact, is a test case, intended to set at rest once and for all the question of seizure of contraband by decisions of a British prize court.

Another question is likely to arise shortly with regard to the "Dacia," that is understood to have left or to be about to leave Savannah for Hamburg and Bremen with a cargo of raw cotton. This is on a different footing to the "Wilhelmina," seeing that in the case of the "Dacia" it is the vessel itself not the cargo the British Authorities object to, on the ground that the transfer of this German bottom to the U.S. flag after the declaration of war was illegal. With regard to its cargo, cotton is not a contraband of war and, as the British Government has already declared, if carried in really neutral bottoms, no difficulties will be placed in the way of delivery.

The use of foreign flags to protect British shipping against attacks of submarines though perhaps undignified, is justifiable under the actual risks of naval warfare and indeed this ruse was resorted to on more than one occasion by the "Emden" itself. The American Government has not only filed no protest in the case of the "Lusitania," but, on the contrary, has demanded explanations from the German Government as to the manner in which their submarines propose to verify the nationality of steamers before attacking.

The sinking of a big neutral passenger steamer, or for that matter, of even a British steamer carrying neutral passengers, would be the signal for an outburst of indignation that might force a wavering world to take sides in the fray and range themselves definitely on one side or the other.

A later cable states that to secure Scandinavian shipping from attack by German submarines, the ships are to be repainted in their respective national colours. If this is extended to U.S. shipping, ocean liners will present a truly gorgeous appearance; star spangled, we presume, at the bow and striped red and white at the stern.

But in the dead of night, when submarines mostly lurk, colours are never very distinguishable and so it may happen that when stripe mingles with stripe and stars are extinguished in the darkness, a thousand or so Americans may be sent without warning to their doom and cries for vengeance re-echo inexorable in the halls of Washington.

Doubtless a lot of smuggling is still going on and will go on so long as neutrals make a profit out of it. There is little sentiment in business, otherwise trading with the enemy would never be declared high treason. But even so, the amount smuggled through must be insignificant compared with what is seized and so fails to reach the enemy. If neutrals are sincere in condemnation of German military practices and their desire for the war to stop, they have only to refrain from contraband dealings to bring Germany quickly to its senses.

The main point at issue with the United States is the right claimed by Great Britain of taking neutral ships into port for detailed examination, a right that could only be renounced by Great Britain were the U.S. Government to guarantee the accuracy of manifests of out-going vessels. Something in this form has already been done and with goodwill on both sides this difficulty will be definitely got over.

#### CONTRABAND — AMERICAN OPINION.

**From the New York "World."** In the prosecution of war with Germany, Great Britain is entitled to utilise all the resources of civilisation. To blockade Germany it has closed the North Sea and yet it has not declared a blockade and assumed its responsibilities. To keep certain supplies out of Germany it has terrorised neutral commerce and so brought disaster on its friends. When remonstrated with, Great Britain pleads necessity and sharp practice on the part of neutrals. This is paltering with a serious subject.

**From the New York "Times."** It is an undisguised secret that no small percentage of the present abnormal exports of the sinews of war indirectly find their way into Germany and Austria-Hungary. . . . Notwithstanding the successful search maintained by the British and French fleets, it is a fact that large shipments from American ports have been successfully landed without interception at neutral ports of Europe, including food-stuffs, copper, brass, boots and shoes and even armour plate.

The national s.s. "Tropieiro," which left last week for the Mediterranean seems likely to have an adventurous voyage, seeing that she has been chartered by an Austrian firm to take coffee to Venice, via Gibraltar and thence, if she can manage it, to Trieste or Fiume.

This, with three or four other steamers was purchased by a Brazilian firm from a national company at Rio Grande do Sul. With some difficulty insurance was arranged on the hull with English underwriters at Rio Grande do Sul and enough coal was found to carry her to Las Palmas. It will be interesting to follow her voyage and note how far she will really get and whether, like so many others, though under the Brazilian flag and ostensibly bound for a neutral port, her cargo, which is conditional contraband, will not be ultimately held up at Gibraltar, as lately occurred with some rubber shipped from Pará, via Rio, to Italy.

Prices must indeed be splendid to induce shipowners to risk their vessels on a business like this when such freight rates as are offering elsewhere.

**Financing the War in France.** So great is the strength of the Bank of France that the French Government has not thought it advisable to complicate matters by offering public loans on a large scale. About £40,000,000 National Defence bonds have been absorbed, but there has been no appeal to popular feeling as in Germany. So far the expenses of the war have, in France, been met from the liquid assets of the banks and have not been distributed among the public as permanent investments. Up to a recent date the Bank of France had advanced £48,000,000 to the Government and is under contract to advance an additional sum that will raise the total to £80,000,000.

**Embargo on Capital Issues.** In connexion with the re-opening of the Stock Exchange the Treasury has had under consideration the general conditions under which new issues of capital in the United Kingdom can be permitted during the continuance of the war.

It appears to the Treasury that in the present crisis all other considerations must be subordinate to the paramount necessity of husbanding the financial resources of the country with a view to the successful prosecution of the war. Accordingly, the Treasury wishes it to be understood that until further notice it feels it imperative in the national interest that fresh issues of capital shall be approved by the Treasury before they are made.

Treasury approval will be governed by the following general conditions:

(1) Issues for undertakings carried on or to be carried on in the United Kingdom shall only be allowed where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Treasury that they are advisable in the national interest.

(2) Issues or participations in issues for undertakings carried on or to be carried on in the British Empire overseas shall only be allowed where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Treasury that urgent necessity and special circumstances exist.

(3) Issues or participations in issues for undertakings carried on or to be carried on outside the British Empire shall not be allowed.

(4) The Treasury will not in ordinary cases insist upon the above restrictions where issues are required for the renewal of Treasury bills or other short instruments held here and falling due of foreign or colonial Governments or municipal corporations or railways or other undertakings.

All applications should be made in the first instance to the Treasury.

The Treasury will not be prepared to approve under paragraph 4 (3) of the Temporary Regulations for the Re-opening of the Stock Exchange any dealings in new issues which have not been approved by the Treasury before they are made.

[This is the thin end of the wedge that the British Foreign Office has for years been anxious to introduce in the negotiations of foreign issues. In Germany, France and most other countries the Stock Exchange is virtually a dependency of Government and foreign issues can be controlled by simply refusing quotation. In Great Britain the Stock Exchange was, until now, free from any Government control and, therefore, had not to receive the consent of the British Government. Now all that is altered and to enable the Stock Exchange to open the

British Government has imposed conditions that so long as the war lasts, and probably after, will make it impossible to issue loans or shares for external purposes at all and only for home purposes on approval by Government. Should these conditions be maintained after the close of the war, it will make really good business much easier and simpler, because authorisation would be equivalent to a guarantee of the soundness of the undertaking and so put a stop to the irresponsible loan-mongering that has inflicted such irreparable loss on British investors. Evidently after the war things are going to be different and both borrowers and lenders be put on their best behaviour.

The default of the Province of Buenos Aires is a case in point. Times out of number investors were warned against trusting a State that treated its creditors as Buenos Aires did some years ago, and yet here they are asking for a fresh moratorium. Baring Brothers, of course, promise to do what they can, and shut the door on fresh issues now the horse has fled, but better than promises of bankers, always hankering after commissions, will be the fiscalisation of the British Government and official disapprobation of all such risky business in future. Not that investors are not to blame also, seeing that it is their hankering after high rates of interest that make such issues possible.]

**Idie Enemy Fleets.** There is a movement in England to hire enemy steamers detained in British ports at the outbreak of the war to British shippers. Vessels, says "The Times," which were merely detained will be available at the end of the war for an exchange with British ships detained in German ports, should Germany be agreeable to the arrangement. Provided suitable precautions were taken this plan would not be prejudiced by the chartering of the ships in the meanwhile. It is known that a number of British owners have already made offers to Government on the subject. There is also a fine fleet of German liners in the Tagus and Portuguese waters, as also in Brazil, but as these countries are not at war with Germany, the case is somewhat different. Still we can see no reason why if proper precautions are taken, ships lying in Brazilian ports should not be rented by neutrals, if Germans are agreeable, at least for the inter-American trade!

**Sugar.** Unwilling as the British Government may be to admit it, the object of the embargo on exports of sugar by Great Britain was not so much to "bring economic pressure on Germany" as alleged, but to cut the losses in which enormous purchases at almost famine prices threatened to involve British markets.

The result is that sugar is now 5s. or 6s. per cwt. dearer in England than almost anywhere else and confectioners and manufacturers are hard put to it to compete with other countries.

It is also alleged that whilst prohibiting private purchases, Government has itself been buying cube sugar from Holland, which is bound to be replaced by German sugars, to the "comfort" of the enemy. If refiners are, naturally, pleased at a policy that plays so directly into their hands, the same cannot be said of confectioners, who account for 25 per cent. of all the sugar imported into Great Britain and mean to make it as nasty as they can for the Government!

**International Banking.** It is announced that arrangements have been come to between Great Britain, France and Russia for financial co-operation not only in aid of weaker allies, such as Serbia or others that, like Roumania and Greece, only await the signal to join the Allies, but also for provision of funds for purchase of materials in the United States and other countries.

A step in this direction seems to have been taken already by the purchase of gold in the U.S.A. by the Bank of France to amount of £2,000,000, against an issue of short term notes, by the National City Bank for account of the French Government. The proceeds of this issue are to be left in New York for purchase of supplies.

**Issue of Treasury Bills.** As there was a mistatement in our last number with regard to the value of the currency bonds to be issued, we now reproduce the decrees:

Decree dated 3rd February, 1915.

The President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil, duly authorised by Law 2,919 of 31st December, 1914, hereby decrees:—

Art. 1. The Minister of Finance is hereby authorised to issue Treasury bills to the value of 50,000 contos of reis gold, exclusively for payment of the deficit in this specie corresponding to the fiscal year 1914 and previous years.

§ 1. These bills shall carry interest at the rate of 5 per cent. gold per annum and shall be payable to bearer and be redeemable within the period of one year from the date of issue.

§ 2. The nominal gold value of the bills shall be as follows: one hundred milreis (100\$000); two hundred milreis (200\$000); five hundred milreis (500\$000); and one conto of reis (1:000\$000).

§ 3. Sums under one hundred milreis (100\$000) shall be paid in gold coin.

Art. 2. In case it were not possible for Government to obtain the requisite amount of gold for amortisation of the bills at due date, payments may be effected in paper money at the exchange of the day.

Art. 3. In case the circumstances of the country should not permit amortisation of the bills issued at due date, the Government reserves the right to pay interest only and renew on same terms both as regards capital and interest.

Art. 4. These bills shall be delivered at their nominal value.

Art. 5. These bills shall be issued at the National Treasury at Rio de Janeiro, where both interest and amortisation will be paid.

Art. 6. Dispositions to the contrary are hereby revoked.

Decree dated 5th February, 1915.

Art. 1. The Minister of Finance is hereby authorised to issue Treasury bills to the value of 100,000 contos of reis paper, exclusively for payment of the deficit in this specie corresponding to the fiscal year 1914 and previous years.

§ 1. These bills shall bear interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum, be payable to bearer and be redeemable within a year from date of issue.

§ 2. Said bills shall be of the following nominal values: 100\$, 200\$, 500\$ and 1:000\$.

§ 3. Debts under 100\$ shall be paid in specie.

Art. 2. Should the circumstances of the country forbid redemption at due date, Government reserves the right of payment of interest only at due date with option of renewal for a similar period at the same rate of interest.

Art. 3. These bills shall be delivered at their nominal value.

Art. 4. These bills shall be issued by the National Treasury at Rio de Janeiro, at which payment of interest and redemption shall be effected.

Art. 5. All dispositions to the contrary are hereby revoked.

For over two years the Federal Government has lived on expedients, until on the outbreak of war, no more money being borrowable, the day of reckoning could no longer be postponed.

Abroad the situation culminated in the funding of the service of the foreign debt and, at home, in what is practically the funding of the floating debt by means of fresh issues of internal bonds.

Both operations are, in effect, forced loans, with the difference that in one case dates for amortisation are predetermined, but not in the other. The market value of such obligations depends chiefly on the prospects of the Federal Government being able to carry out its engagements, by no means at present reassuring.

Forced loans must always be odious, justifiable only in cases of national emergency when equally distributed.

But when the burden of such a loan falls exclusively on one class and that the most useful servant of the community, no more unfair or detestable method of paying debts could well be practised.

Bare of credit and unable to collect their just debts, in lieu of bread home creditors are offered a bone. This they reject and demand that, if sacrifices are to be made, that they shall be imposed on all alike by making the bonds legal tender.

Only in this way, in fact, is it possible to distribute the burden of debt equally over the whole community; in plain language, by making the whole community responsible for whatever depreciation of the currency may ensue!

At the meeting at the Associação Commercial on Thursday there was some violent talking on the part of aggrieved creditors demanding instant payment in hard cash or at least in paper money. But as that is impossible, seeing that Government has no authorisation from Congress to emit any paper money whatsoever, much less the gigantic sums requisite for liquidation of the whole floating debt, there seems no alternative but to either await next session or accept the Government issue of bonds.

This the majority of the assembly decided to do after a good deal of discussion of first principles, with a rider requesting the Board to use its good offices to induce the Minister of Finance to ascribe what was termed "valor literario" to the bonds about to be issued, or, in plain language, to make them legal tender in virtue of Art. 4 of the Estimates of Resources for the current year, which runs as follows:—

"For liquidation of the deficit for 1914 (etc.) the Government is authorised to undertake operations of credit "at home or abroad and to issue either ordinary or special "bonds (titulos) with interest payable in paper or gold, "etc., etc."

We fail to understand how such an authorisation can be twisted by any ingenuity to comprise issues of paper money, nor does it seem likely that Government will agree to sophisticate a law of its own initiative, particularly in view of the very strong sentiments expressed on the subject by more than one member of the Government.

For our part, we believe that, so long as the war lasts, and perhaps some years after, the Brazilian Government will be forced to issue a great deal more paper money than is now demanded for the mere liquidation of floating debt, and that, instead of this hand-to-mouth policy, some systematic method should at once be adopted not only for future issues but for their redemption later on.

Compared with 1913, the value of Exports and Imports shows the gigantic shrinkage of £50,000,000 or Rs. 800,000,000\$.

No country could face such loss to its trade without shaking commerce to its foundations.

With us the debacle is intensified by the failure of Government to meet its commercial engagements.

For next year prospects seem worse still. Already in consequence of the rise in freights, some of our products are unexportable and others tending rapidly to become so.

As regards coffee the promise of a relatively large crop and expectation of greatly diminished consumption make one despair of any improvement in local conditions so long as the war lasts, unless steps are taken at once to provide for the purchase of next crop's surplus and holding it until the close of the war, as was done in the United States with cotton.

Fearful of initiative and divided in council, we here waste both resources and opportunity by undertaking too late measures that taken betimes would have saved the situation.

Only lately the ex-Minister of Finance protested he would emit no paper money, yet he issued 250,000 contos, when by a timely issue of 100,000 contos he might a couple of years ago have secured a foreign loan and thus have saved monetarily the situation!

Had the British Government acted in this way, the British Empire would by this time have been bankrupt and the Germans in Paris, or perhaps London!

Since writing the above a commission of the Associação Commercial waited on the Minister of Finance, Dr. Sabino Barroso, who declared that he could not agree that a simple disposition of the Estimates could be interpreted as authorising Government to convert simple bonds into legal tender. For that, the Minister maintains, a special law would be requisite.

As regards the proposed increase of interest on the gold bonds from 5 to 6 per cent., Dr. Sabino promised to give it his attention, reminding the commission of the delicate position of exchange and that in spite of the relief afforded by the late funding loan, Government had still some £4,000,000 to pay abroad.

There can be no doubt of the sincerity of the Minister of Finance in his condemnation of paper money. But circumstances are often stronger even than principles and have already forced Dr. Sabino Barroso to consent to the issue of some 20,000 contos and will, we fear, oblige him to issue very much more.

Economic and financial pressure is stronger often than sentiment; instance the Associação Commercial, who after condemning paper money in toto, now try to justify a surreptitious issue!

We are convinced that further issues of paper money are indispensable, but we are nevertheless persuaded that the worst thing that could happen would be to issue paper money without due authorisation.

There has been far too much of such loose interpretation of legislative authorisations and it is time it should stop.

It is, in fact, on its determination to interpret legislative authorisation solely in accordance with the interests of the Treasury that the actual Government has, with general approval taken its stand. If more paper money must, as we believe, be issued, it must stand over until Congress can authorise the emission and until then creditors must get along as they can with their bonds, remembering that half a loaf is better than no bread.

It is difficult to understand how anything I have said or written could be construed as meaning that large issues of paper money or other legal tender intended chiefly for payment of debts abroad could fail to effect exchange in its actual state of unstable equilibrium.

The value measured in money of any commodity depends on the demand and supply of that particular commodity. Speculation is but a factor of one or the other.

The commodity gold, represented here chiefly by sterling bills of exchange is no exception and its price is determined by the demand and supply of gold and bills and nothing else. Speculation may by buying futures or retaining bills, produce an artificial scarcity and consequently, if it last long enough, bring about a fall of exchange. The contrary would occur if the supply were enhanced by selling futures or by importing the metal, etc. The factors that constitute demand and supply vary so incessantly as to make their reduction to formulae by which the rate of exchange can be forecast impracticable. At the same time, there are certain elements that, *ceteris paribus*, permit us to forecast the general trend of exchanges, such as prices and the volume of imports and exports. Such calculations are, however, liable to be upset by speculation, that is, by the anticipation of economic and financial phenomena, founded on experience and superior or prior information.

The increase of an inconvertible currency can only affect its value through prices. The price of gold or of bills, we repeat, depends exclusively on the demand and supply for that commodity. The speculative demand may be stimulated by abundance of money or restricted by a sudden contraction of the currency, but in the long run it is not the speculative demand or supply but the real factors that determine prices.

Though an increase in the volume of currency may seem *prima facie* evidence of an increase in the demand for bills, it does not necessarily follow that, other factors being unaltered, there would be a corresponding increase in the demand for bills, unless money were to be remitted.

When exchanges are falling, the tendency would be to remit as little as possible and allow money to accumulate on this side.

Nothing could prevent commodity prices from falling so long as the available supply of any particular commodity produced in the country exceeded the demand and, vice-versa, from rising, in spite of repeated issues of paper money so long as local demand exceeded local supply.

With regard to international commodities of trade, like coffee, the case is different. Supposing that 500,000 contos of paper money were suddenly issued, would that stimulate appreciably consumption of coffee or leave less for export? The increase in the volume of the currency would be powerless to affect consumption or raise even the local price of coffee so long as the relations of supply and demand of the article and that the demand and supply of bills and the rate of exchange determined thereby were unaltered.

The subject, however, is too abstruse for paragraphs.

**A Disloyal Servant.** Earl Curzon, referring to the case of Sir Roger Casement, said at the beginning of the war he went to Germany, where he was accused of disgraceful and disloyal acts. His friends wrote attributing those accusations to malice. Since then the proceedings seemed to have been characterised by the perfect possession of his faculties, and the latest thing they regretted to hear was that he had prepared a document, which was being circulated by the German Foreign Office, appealing for an alliance between Germany and Ireland, and America thrown in, against England. That was unworthy of comment, but he desired to ask whether this official, who had risen to some distinction in the service of his country and had been honoured by a title, and had been for some years in the enjoyment of a pension, was to be allowed to continue to retain that pension.

In reply, the Lord Chancellor said he would enquire whether or not Sir Roger Casement was entitled to a pension, but even if were it was evident he would not be in a position to draw it. He agreed that such an attitude as Sir Roger Casement was reported to have taken should be not only the subject of severe blame, but followed as far as possible by the infliction of severe penalties. It was sad that a man who did some good services should, assuming him to be in possession of his faculties, have fallen so low as he appears to have done.

[Sir Roger Casement was always a bit of a crank and, what with the "wrongs of Ireland" and Congo atrocities, I imagine, not quite responsible. I recollect, when I was director of commercial statistics, his insisting on the Brazilian statistics of Irish foreign trade being separately stated, citing the case of the "Olympic," or some other big liner, built at Belfast, being classed as an import from Great Britain instead of Ireland. Sir Roger Casement was a specialist on atrocities, and, had he not gone over to the enemy, might have been invaluable in demonstrating to his countrymen the true inwardness of German sympathies.]

**American Trade.** The favourable balance of trade in the United States is assuming vast proportions and for December in all probability will have exceeded £25,000,000. Exporters are making large profits and prices are likely to be maintained. The only weak point is cotton, in which there is over-production. If the foreign trade of the U.S. continues on the December basis that country will be able to absorb some £100,000,000 of securities now held abroad during the year. These bonds will be taken back in payment of wheat and commodities sold to Europe. By selling a big crop of wheat at high prices and buying bonds and stocks at bargain prices the U.S. will be enriched and from being a Debtor be on the way to become a Creditor country.

This, however, means that, instead of looking to Europe, the U.S. must itself supply capital for its requirements. Apart from the speculation which great prosperity invariably provokes,

the question is whether the accumulations in the U. S. A. will suffice to simultaneously pay off external debt and finance American internal requirements?

**Brazil Five per Cent. Funding Bonds, 1914.** Messrs. N. M. Rothschild and Sons announce that the scrip is now ready for delivery in exchange for the receipts for coupons due December 1, 1914, and January 1, 1915.

**Dear Bread in England.** The average price of wheat in January of last year was 32s. 1d., rising to 35s. 6d. in June. In July it dropped to 34s. 11d., but in August commenced rising until Mark Lane quotations reached 45s. in December. There seems every probability of a further rise and in fact English wheat already fetched in January 50s. The lowest price at which wheat can be planted to pay in England is said to be over 35s.

The rise of 10s. since July is equivalent to 1¼d. per quartern loaf. In the country the rise was smaller. The advance of a shilling a quarter in the price of flour brings the price of town household's up to 42s. per 280lbs., an increase since end of July of 13s. and raises the price of the 4lb. loaf from 6½d. to 7d. Last summer freight for a ton of wheat from Argentina cost only 11s. 3d., whilst last month (December) 50s. was paid; 25s. was considered a good profitable rate. Another factor in the rise is cost of coal and insurance and especially delay in loading and unloading owing to congestion in British ports and lack of labour. Dock labourers are now making as much as £5 a week. Some ships have been lying in the Thames for over a month without finding berths. Such delays have to be taken into account by shipowners in fixing freight rates.

Subsidiary causes are heavy buying in Italy and France, the closing of the Black Sea, failure of the Australian crop and reports of unsettled weather from Argentina.

## COFFEE

Santos, February 13th, 1915.

In spite of consecutively lower advices from New York, the Santos market not only maintained its advance expressed in the official quotation, but raised it to Rs. 3\$900 per 10 kilos for No. 6, weaker and declining exchange permitting the execution of orders at lower limits here and particularly at Rio. Although at this time of the year there is no fear of being inundated with cheap coffee, the rule seems to be to bear prices on the slightest symptom of weakness in Brazilian exchange.

The supply of really desirable coffees is falling off so rapidly that it will be difficult in any case to supply all requirements for the next three months and until the harvesting of the new crop commences, in which case the best policy to follow would seem to buy whenever a decline occurs.

The decline of receipts is now more marked and may now be counted to continue until the figures become more in accordance with the season of the year, that is, as soon as the Mogyana line has worked off its stock, estimated at the beginning of February at 500,000 to 600,000 bags.

Part of such remittances are likely to include some 200,000 to 250,000 bags if not more, of lowest grades (triage).

At Itapura alone, where the current crop was very small, 40,000 to 50,000 bags of the 1913-14 crop were held back, and are now being hurried to market in view of the remunerative price offered in the States for fine old crop qualities.

Under such circumstances, the interior seems likely to be swept bare of coffee by the time the new crop commences.

Shipments increased on the arrival of two Dutch steamers, which took about 150,000 bags and, as several other steamers are about to be berthed for the States, the outflow promises to be continuous.

From the interior the rainfall is reported to have been generally light and in some instances deficient. Large quantities of cereals have been planted this year that stand urgently in need of rain and so perhaps colour reports. Plantations are, nevertheless, reported to be looking well and flourishing.

As was to be expected in view of the paralysation of inland traffic and business generally during the first months of the war, planters are now making up for lost time, with the result that entries are larger than ever before in the month of February.

Fortunately "embarques" are on a corresponding scale, so that stocks at Rio and Santos show an increase for the week ended 11th February of only 3,990 bags and a decrease of 50,380 bags compared with the same week last year.

Clearances, owing to shortage of steamers, were smaller than for the previous week, but embarques were 19,433 bags larger and sales of 129,875 bags more even than for the previous week were declared!

Of the coffee "sailed," 263,853 bags went to Europe and only 7,251 bags to the United States.

Up to February 7th, the total value of coffee cleared at the two ports was £15,734,637. as against £30,387,672 last year, a shrinkage of £14,653,035 or 48.2 per cent. for little over 7 months of the crop.

Higher grades are still in request, whilst low grades are difficult to dispose of. The few mills left at Santos for separating and improving coffees are all consequently hard at work.

In Venezuela coffee planting and trading interests are almost entirely in the hands of Germans, who are finding great difficulties in either financing or moving the crop. This, however, will be but temporary and if the coffee is wanted means will be found to dispose of it.

The s.s. "Ikaria," belonging to or chartered by the Lamport and Holt line, sailed from this port on December 20th with 24,200 bags of coffee from Santos and 1,000 from Rio. This steamer was one of the earliest victims of the recently declared piratical German policy. The loss, of course, will fall on the underwriters in this instance, probably British. Amongst the shippers were several German firms.

**Havre Quotations, 18th January:** March options, 53 frs. and 52 frs. for other months.

**Movement at the Port of Rio de Janeiro** for seven months of crop, July-January:—

Entries—	1912-13	1913-14	1914-15
Central Railway .....	1,730,359	1,803,006	1,492,106
Coastwise .....	108,622	61,950	30,617
Within Bay .....	39,843	41,818	26,639
In transit .....	196,823	349,993	177,522
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>2,075,647</b>	<b>2,256,767</b>	<b>1,726,884</b>

Loadings:—

United States .....	630,359	614,027	423,947
Europe .....	816,673	768,960	766,808
South Africa .....	63,901	74,399	108,983
River Plate and Pacific .....	83,683	71,782	52,476
Coastwise .....	7,793	212,623	158,031
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>1,822,400</b>	<b>1,741,791</b>	<b>1,510,245</b>

Clearances:—

United States .....	725,701	744,633	496,286
Europe .....	962,694	850,917	798,466
South Africa .....	71,998	82,256	112,933
River Plate and Pacific .....	87,458	88,587	76,279
Coastwise .....	177,470	193,534	140,922
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>2,025,321</b>	<b>1,959,927</b>	<b>1,624,886</b>

## Coffee Market

ENTRIES.

IN BAGS OF 60 KILOS.

RIO	FOR THE WEEK ENDED			FOR THE CROP TO	
	Feb. 11 1915	Feb. 4 1915	Feb. 12 1914	Feb. 11 1915	Feb. 12 1914
Central and Leopoldina Ry.....	91,102	64,885	38,470	1,625,200	1,868,762
Inland.....	2,476	1,752	846	31,115	42,665
Coastwise, discharged ..	1,740	2,543	714	32,669	62,065
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>95,327</b>	<b>69,180</b>	<b>40,030</b>	<b>1,689,074</b>	<b>1,974,092</b>
Transferido from Rio to Nietheroy .....	783	1,065	1,445	24,018	48,503
<b>Net Entries at Rio</b> .....	<b>94,544</b>	<b>68,115</b>	<b>38,585</b>	<b>1,665,056</b>	<b>1,925,589</b>
Nietheroy from Rio & Leopoldina.....	12,923	8,864	4,425	214,846	223,558
<b>Total Rio, including Nietheroy &amp; transit.</b>	<b>107,467</b>	<b>76,979</b>	<b>43,010</b>	<b>1,879,902</b>	<b>2,149,147</b>
<b>Total Santos:</b>	<b>214,181</b>	<b>216,156</b>	<b>104,255</b>	<b>7,562,872</b>	<b>9,512,114</b>
<b>Total Rio &amp; Santos.</b>	<b>321,648</b>	<b>293,135</b>	<b>147,265</b>	<b>9,442,774</b>	<b>11,661,261</b>

The coast arrivals for the week ended Feb. 11th, 1915, were from:—

S. João da Barra.....	1,100
Santos.....	649
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>1,749</b>

The total entries by the different S. Paulo Railways for the Crop to Feb. 11th, 1915 were as follows:

	Past Jundiahy	Per Sorocabana and others	Total at S. Paulo	Total at Santos	Remaining at S. Paulo
1914/1915	6,365,719	1,201,543	7,567,262	7,562,872	—
1913/1914	9,050,958	414,875	9,465,833	9,512,114	—

## COFFEE SAILED.

During the week ending February 11th, 1915, was consigned to the following destinations:—

IN BAGS OF 60 KILOS.

PORTS	UNITED STATS	EUROPE & MEDITER- RANEAN	COAST	RIVER PLATE	CAPE	OTHER PORTS	TOTAL FOR WEEK	CROP TO DATE
Rio.....	7,251	59,675	530	2,751	—	—	70,207	1,777,415
Santos...	—	234,178	—	5,223	—	—	239,400	6,090,995
<b>1914/1915.</b>	<b>7,251</b>	<b>293,853</b>	<b>530</b>	<b>7,973</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>270,607</b>	<b>7,868,410</b>
<b>1913/1914.</b>	<b>43,728</b>	<b>120,741</b>	<b>0,015</b>	<b>3,524</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>186,008</b>	<b>8,093,703</b>

**VALUE OF COFFEE CLEARED FOR FOREIGN PORTS.**

DURING THE WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 11th, 1915.  
IN BAGS OF 60 KILOS.

	Feb. 11	Feb. 4	Feb. 11	Feb. 4	Crop to Feb. 11	
	Bags	Bags	£	£	Bags	£
Rio.....	69,677	150,430	108,299	232,197	1,635,328	2,698,671
Santos.....	209,400	345,551	406,508	655,055	6,090,975	13,035,966
Total 1914/1915..	279,077	495,981	514,807	887,252	7,726,303	15,734,637
do 1913/1914..	186,008	90,511	524,339	241,339	10,393,793	30,387,672

**COFFEE LOADED (EMBARQUES).**

IN BAGS OF 60 KILOS.

	DURING WEEK ENDED			FOR THE CROP TO	
	1915 Feb. 11	1915 Feb. 4	1914 Feb. 12	1915 Feb. 11	1914 Feb. 12
Rio.....	78,814	96,891	45,641	1,641,215	1,802,711
Nietheroy.....	11,007	20,670	4,100	209,648	213,010
In transit.....	—	—	—	—	—
Total Rio including Nietheroy & transit.....	89,821	117,561	49,741	1,850,863	2,015,721
Santos.....	247,451	200,376	177,235	6,325,117	8,796,946
Rio & Santos.....	347,272	317,937	226,976	8,175,980	10,812,667

**FOREIGN STOCKS.**

IN BAGS OF 60 KILOS.

	Feb./1915.	Feb./1915.	Feb./1914.
United States Ports ...	1,182,000	1,168,000	1,483,000
Havre.....	1,806,000	1,818,000	2,694,000
Bolh.....	2,978,000	2,978,000	4,177,000
Deliveries United States Visible Supply at United States ports.....	108,000	153,000	86,000
	1,748,000	1,879,000	2,001,000

**SALES OF COFFEE.**

DURING THE WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 11th, 1915.

	Feb. 11 1915	Feb. 4 1915	Feb. 12/1914
Rio.....	67,008	39,867	43,217
Santos.....	206,616	103,942	9,482
Total.....	273,624	143,809	152,699

**OUR OWN STOCK.**

IN BAGS OF 60 KILOS.

RIO Stock on Feb. 4th, 1914.....	135,132
Entries during week ended Feb. 11th, 1915.....	94,644
Loaded «Embarques», for the week Feb. 11th, 1915.....	229,676
	78,814
STOCK IN RIO ON Feb. 11th, 1915.....	150,862
Stock at Nietheroy and Porto da Madama on Feb. 4th, 1915.....	27,476
« Afloat on Feb. 4th, 1915.....	57,566
Entries at Nietheroy plus total «embarques» inclu- ding transit.....	102,744
	187,780
Deduct: «embarques» at Nietheroy, Porto da Ma- dama and Vianna and sailings during the week Feb. 11th, 1915.....	81,214
STOCK IN NICTHEROY AND AFLOAT ON Feb. 11th 1915	106,572
STOCK IN 1st and 2nd HANDS and THOSE AT NICTHEROY and AFLOAT ON Feb. 11th 1915.....	257,431
SANTOS Stock on Feb. 4th, 1914.....	1,879,381
Entries for week ended Feb. 11th, 1915.....	214,181
	2,093,562
Loaded («embarques») during same week.....	247,451
STOCK IN SANTOS ON Feb. 11th, 1915.....	1,846,111
Stock in Rio and Santos on Feb. 11th, 1915.....	2,104,545
do do on Feb. 4th, 1915.....	2,009,555
do do on Feb. 12th 1914.....	2,163,925

**COFFEE PRICE CURRENT.**

DURING THE WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 11th, 1915.

	Feb. 5	Feb. 6	Feb. 8	Feb. 9	Feb. 10	Feb. 11	Ave- rage.
RIO—							
Market N. 6 10 kilos	4.630	4.630	4.630	—	—	4.765	—
» N. 7	4.698	4.698	4.698	4.698	4.700	4.834	4.705
» N. 8	4.358	4.358	4.358	—	—	4.494	—
» N. 9	4.426	4.46	4.426	4.426	4.494	4.562	4.433
SANTOS—							
Superior per 10 kilos...	4.800	4.500	4.500	4.900	4.900	4.900	4.883
Good average.....	3.790	3.700	3.700	3.700	3.700	3.700	3.700
N. YORK, per lb							
Spot N. 7..... cent	—	—	—	—	7 7/8	—	7.88
» » 8..... »	—	—	—	—	7 5/8	—	7.63
Options—							
» May..... »	6 09	6 12	—	6 07	5 54	5 93	6 03
» July..... »	7 09	7 12	—	7 10	6 95	6 96	7 02
» Sept..... »	7 29	7 31	—	7 27	7 15	7 09	7 25

**MANIFESTS OF COFFEE.**

RIO DE JANEIRO.

During the week ending February 11th, 1915.

2 ORINO—Montevideo .....	Francisco Sattamini ..	100
2 BYRON—New York .....	Hard. Rand & Co. ....	5,000
Ditto— ..	McLaughlin & Co. ....	2,001
Ditto— ..	Theodor Wille & Co. ....	1,250
Ditto— ..	Pinheiro & Ladeira ..	1,000
4 DENBIGHSHIRE; Havre .....	Louis Boher & Co. ....	3,000
Ditto— ..	Me. K. Schmidt & Co. ....	3,000
Ditto— ..	Pinheiro & Ladeira ..	1,000
Ditto— ..	Hard. Rand & Co. ....	1,000
6 FLORES—Amsterdam .....	Ornstein & Co. ....	5,000
Ditto— ..	Lutz Campos ..	4,000
Ditto— ..	Eugen Urban & Co. ....	1,000
6 LEON XIII—B. Aires .....	Ornstein & Co. ....	850
Ditto— ..	Stolle Emerson & Co. ....	400
Ditto— ..	Sundry ..	1
Ditto—Montevideo .....	Theodor Wille & Co. ....	250
Ditto— ..	Ornstein & Co. ....	200
Ditto— ..	Pinto & Co. ....	159
9 MOSKOV—Copenhagen .....	Theodor Wille & Co. ....	5,000
Ditto— ..	Ornstein & Co. ....	3,000
Ditto— ..	Eugen Urban & Co. ....	2,000
Ditto— ..	Me. K. Schmidt & C. ....	750
Ditto— ..	Roberto Schoena & C. ....	750
Ditto— ..	Castro Silva & Co. ....	500
Ditto— ..	Zerrenner Bulow & C. ....	250
—TUBANTIA B. Aires .....	Theodor Wille & Co. ....	800
—PROVENCE Marseilles .....	Me. K. Schmidt & C. ....	3,250
Ditto— ..	Louis Boher & Co. ....	2,000
Ditto— ..	Karl Valais ..	2,000
Ditto— ..	Pinto & Co. ....	625
Ditto— ..	Pinheiro & Ladeira ..	500
Ditto—Pireus .....	Hard. Rand & Co. ....	5,875
Ditto— ..	Pinto & Co. ....	1,000
Ditto— ..	Coop. Minas Geraes ..	500
Ditto—Salonica .....	Hard. Rand & Co. ....	3,125
Ditto— ..	Me. K. Schmidt & Co. ....	1,875
Ditto— ..	Pinto & Co. ....	1,000
Ditto—Oran .....	Pinto & Co. ....	1,975
Ditto— ..	Castro Silva & Co. ....	500
Ditto—Tunis .....	Pinto & Co. ....	1,500
Ditto—Alexandria .....	Hard. Rand & Co. ....	1,000
Ditto—Malta .....	Me. K. Schmidt & Co. ....	625
Ditto— ..	Hard. Rand & Co. ....	375
Ditto—Las Palmas .....	Castro Silva & Co. ....	475
Ditto—Mostaganem .....	Castro Silva & Co. ....	250
Ditto— ..	Pinto & Co. ....	125
Ditto—Canea .....	Pinto & Co. ....	250
Ditto—Dedegatch .....	Pinto & Co. ....	250
Ditto—Sousse .....	Pinto & Co. ....	125
Ditto—Algiers .....	Castro Silva & Co. ....	125
Ditto—Bougie .....	Castro Silva & Co. ....	125
Ditto—Mellila .....	Castro Silva & Co. ....	25
Ditto—Corfu .....	Me. K. Schmidt & Co. ....	125
Ditto—Retemi .....	Pinto & Co. ....	125
Ditto—Tangiers .....	Castro Silva & Co. ....	100
Total overseas .....		69,677

RIO DE JANEIRO—COASTWISE.

7-TUPY—Pará	Ornstein & Co	415	
Ditto	Ornstein & Co	55	
Ditto	Ornstein & Co	50	
Ditto	Ornstein & Co	10	530

SANTOS.

During the week ending February 11th, 1915.

2 ARAGUAYA—London	Ed. Johnston & Co	4,295	
Ditto	R. Alves Toledo & Co	4,000	
Ditto	Geo. W. Ennor	2,781	
Ditto	Malta & Co	2,500	
Ditto	Hard, Rand & Co	500	
Ditto	Zerrenner Bulow & C.	250	14,236

3-1. IZABEL—B. Aires	Ed. Johnston & Co	1,288	
Ditto	Nossack & Co	150	
Ditto	Prado Ferreira & Co.	50	
Ditto—Montevideo	Nossack & Co	100	
Ditto	Ed. Johnston & Co	50	
Ditto	Pupo & Filho	23	
Ditto	Pascual Gomes	22	1,663

3-K. MARGARETA—Gothemburg.	Eugen Urban & Co	5,500	
Ditto	Theodor Wille & Co.	3,500	
Ditto	Schmidt Trost & Co.	3,500	
Ditto	R. Alves Toledo & Co.	3,000	
Ditto	Hard, Rand & Co	2,250	
Ditto	Diebold & Co	2,250	
Ditto	Dauch & Co	2,000	
Ditto	Whitaker Brotero & C.	1,801	
Ditto	Levy & Co	1,625	
Ditto	Cia. Prado Chaves	1,500	
Ditto	Nossack & Co	1,000	
Ditto	Société F. Bresilienne.	500	
Ditto	G. Trinks	440	
Ditto	Leon Israel & Bros.	500	
Ditto	Michaelsen Wright & C.	250	
Ditto	Zerrenner Bulow & C.	250	
Ditto—Malmö	Eugen Urban & Co.	5,000	
Ditto	Hard, Rand & Co.	2,000	
Ditto	Nossack & Co	2,000	
Ditto	J. Aron & Co	1,500	
Ditto	Cia. Prado Chaves	1,750	
Ditto	Leon Israel & Bros.	500	
Ditto	M. Wright & Co	500	
Ditto	Theodor Wille & Co.	250	
Ditto	Nioac & Co	250	
Ditto—Stockholm	Ed. Johnston & Co.	2,250	
Ditto	Hard, Rand & Co	2,125	
Ditto	Société F. Bresilienne.	2,000	
Ditto	Naumann Gepp & Co.	1,125	
Ditto	Leon Israel & Bros.	1,000	
Ditto	Whitaker Brotero & C.	992	
Ditto	Eugen Urban & Co	900	
Ditto	Cia. Prado Chaves	500	
Ditto	Naumann Gepp & Co.	500	
Ditto	Diebold & Co	125	
Ditto—Christiania	Eugen Urban & Co	2,750	
Ditto	Hard, Rand & Co	1,875	
Ditto	Ed. Johnston & Co	750	
Ditto	Cia. Prado Chaves	500	
Ditto	G. Trinks & Co	500	
Ditto	Levy & Co.	375	
Ditto	Whitaker Brotero & C.	250	
Ditto	Schmidt Trost & Co.	8	62,141

—CACHALOTE—B. Aires	Luciano Castro	—	200
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3-PROVENCE—Marseilles	R. Alves Toledo & Co.	4,035	
Ditto	Nioac & Co	4,000	
Ditto	Hard Rand & Co	3,500	
Ditto	Leite & Santos	2,000	
Ditto	Leme Ferreira & Co.	1,000	
Ditto	Cia. Prado Chaves	625	
Ditto	Malta & Co.	500	
Ditto	Levy & Co	500	
Ditto—Piren	Hard, Rand & Co	1,000	
Ditto	Cia. Prado Chaves	125	
Ditto—Piren	Cia. Prado Chaves	750	18,035

—DENBIGHSHIRE—Havre	Whitaker Brotero & C.	24,091	
Ditto	Nioac & Co	10,000	
Ditto	Cia. Prado Chaves	10,000	
Ditto	R. Alves Toledo & Co.	9,927	
Ditto	Levy & Co.	5,000	
Ditto	Ed. Johnston & Co.	2,000	
Ditto	Malta & Co.	1,000	
Ditto	Leon Israel & Bros.	500	
Ditto	Luiz Supley	73	62,591

—T. DI SAVOIA—Genoa	Cia. Prado Chaves	1,625	
Ditto	Cia. Puglisi	1,355	
Ditto	Pasquale Barberis	1,000	
Ditto	Hard, Rand & Co	625	
Ditto	G. Tomaselli & Co	355	
Ditto	Bell & Co	210	
Ditto	Freo. Casae	136	
Ditto	Pupo & Filho	100	

—T. DI SAVOIA—Genoa	Sundry	5	
Ditto—Naples	G. Tomaselli & Co	12	
Ditto	Nino Paganetti	4	
Ditto	Theodor Wille & Co.	1	
Ditto	Sundry	2	5,430

4—MOSKOV—Copenhagen	Eugen Urban & Co	7,525	
Ditto	R. Alves Toledo & Co.	3,750	
Ditto	Theodor Wille & Co.	3,500	
Ditto	Diebold & Co	2,500	
Ditto	Naumann Gepp & Co.	1,000	
Ditto	Nossack & Co	1,000	
Ditto	Theodor Wille & Co.	1	19,276

4—MARGARET—Stockholm	M. Wright & Co	4,000	
Ditto	Theodor Wille & Co.	1,000	
Ditto	J. Aron & Co	500	
Ditto	Whitaker Brotero & C.	250	
Ditto—Gothemburg	Eugen Urban & Co	1,000	
Ditto	Société F. Bresilienne.	1,000	
Ditto	Whitaker Brotero & C.	627	
Ditto—Stockholm	Theodor Wille & Co.	1,000	
Ditto	Whitaker Brotero & C.	625	
Ditto	Naumann Gepp & Co.	500	
Ditto	M. Wright & Co	250	
Ditto	G. Trinks & Co	250	
Ditto—Christiania	Eugen Urban & Co	1,000	
Ditto	M. Wright & Co	750	
Ditto	Whitaker Brotero & C.	250	
Ditto	Schmidt Trost & Co.	1	13,003

—ITALIA—B. Aires	Eugen Urban & Co	500	
Ditto	Hard, Rand & Co	267	
Ditto	G. Trinks & Co	217	984

6—TOSCANA—Genoa	S. A. Martinelli	3,921	
Ditto	Cia. Puglisi	1,617	
Ditto	Nossack & Co	500	
Ditto	Queiroz F. Azevedo	500	
Ditto	Cia. Prado Chaves	800	
Ditto	G. M. Melillo	359	
Ditto	Cia. Paul. A. Geraes.	324	
Ditto	Bell & Co	100	
Ditto	P. Maccioratti	55	
Ditto	Villas Boas & Co.	30	
Ditto	Sundry	3	
Ditto—Naples	S. A. Martinelli	317	
Ditto	Cia. Puglisi	260	
Ditto	P. Maccioratti	256	
Ditto	Amedeu Frugoli & Co.	188	
Ditto	Cia. Prado Chaves	125	
Ditto	Cia. Paul. A. Geraes.	31	
Ditto	Villas Boas & Co.	30	9,466

7—LEON XIII—B. Aires	Freitas Lima Nogueira	—	500
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8—R. DE LA PLATA—B. Aires	R. Alves Toledo & Co.	1,563	
Ditto	Ed. Johnston & Co.	292	1,855

Total overseas 209,400

SANTOS—COASTWISE

—ARAQUARY—Rio	José Ma. Monteiro	—	649
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Per DESTINATIONS.

France and Colonies	97,861
Sweden	66,135
Denmark	31,526
Greece	16,600
Great Britain & Colonies	15,236
Italy	14,886
Holland	10,000
Norway	9,069
South America	7,973
United States	7,251
Egypt	2,125
Portugal	475

PER SHIPPERS.

Brazilian	101,459
German and Austrian	71,068
Doubtful	36,131
American	32,792
British	24,492
Italian	7,635
French	5,500
<hr/>	
	279,077
Coastwise	1,179
<hr/>	
	280,256

Coastwise 279,077  
1,179  
280,256

PER SHIPPING COMPANIES.

British	92,076
Swedish	75,144
French	47,460
Danish	31,526
Italian	15,880
Dutch	10,800
Spanish	4,036
Norwegian	1,855
Argentine	200
Brazilian	100
<hr/>	
	279,077
Coastwise	1,179
<hr/>	
	280,256



COFFEE SAILED DURING THE MONTH OF JANUARY, 1915.

Per Destination.	Rio	Santos	Total
New York	60,026	391,855	451,881
New Orleans	53,685	205,162	258,847
Stockholm	28,509	33,258	61,767
Havre	28,120	124,108	152,228
Copenhagen	20,168	37,420	57,588
Amsterdam	17,006	239,737	256,743
Marseilles	19,919	32,627	52,546
Thessalonica	14,125	500	14,625
Alagoa Bay	12,400	—	12,400
Cape Town	11,160	—	11,160
Genoa	11,582	93,132	104,714
Gothemburg	9,376	34,875	44,251
Pireus	7,125	—	7,125
Christiania	6,750	15,375	22,125
Buenos Aires	6,664	5,617	12,281
Port Natal	5,500	—	5,500
Malmo	4,970	28,153	33,123
London	4,939	13,550	18,489
Sundsvall	4,500	—	4,500
Oran	4,375	—	4,375
East London	4,050	—	4,050
Mossel Bay	4,275	—	4,275
Halmstad	3,500	—	3,500
Gefle	3,750	—	3,750
Liverpool	2,673	—	2,673
Drontheim	2,750	—	2,750
Delegoa Bay	2,650	—	2,650
Orrebro	2,000	—	2,000
Montevideo	1,825	125	1,950
Hernosand	1,500	—	1,500
Bergen	1,250	—	1,250
Norkoping	1,250	—	1,250
Teneriffe	800	—	800
Ornskoldsvik	750	—	750
Hudissval	750	—	750
Malta	700	—	700
Las Palmas	600	—	600
Soderham	500	—	500
Algiers	500	—	500
Kalmar	375	—	375
Mostaganem	375	—	375
Tripoli	375	—	375
Ystad	250	—	250
Skien	250	—	250
Patras	250	—	250
Mitileny	250	—	250
Lisbon	254	23	277
Iha Chipre	250	—	250
Dramen	250	—	250
Carlskrona	250	—	250
Dakar	250	—	250
Leixoes	201	—	201
Christiansund	200	—	200
Vigo	150	400	550
Tunis	125	—	125
Philippeville	125	—	125
Gijon	125	—	125
Candia	125	—	125
Bordeaux	—	5,253	5,253
Alexandria	—	19,700	19,700
Naples	—	2,007	2,007
Santander	—	890	890
Avilez	—	250	250
San Sebastian	—	200	200
Cadiz	—	1	1

Total overseas 371,403 1,284,263 1,655,666

COASTWISE.

Pará	6,570	—	6,570
Porto Alegre	5,417	—	5,417
Manáos	3,955	—	3,955
Pelotas	2,064	—	2,064
Maranhão	2,105	—	2,105
Rio Grande	1,125	—	1,125
Porteleza	385	—	385
Laguna	350	—	350
Mossoró	320	—	320
Maceió	345	—	345
Pernambuco	908	—	908
Aracaty	200	—	200
Maceau	173	—	173
Obidos	155	177	332
Itacoatiara	135	—	135
Natal	110	—	110
Fubitubá	75	—	75
Corumbá	50	—	50
Parintens	60	—	60
Santarem	80	—	80
Tutoya	70	—	70
S. Francisco	30	—	30
Cabedello	23	—	23
Oamocim	20	—	20

Total coastwise 24,675 177 24,852  
Total overseas 371,403 1,284,263 1,655,666

Grand total 396,078 1,284,440 1,680,518

PER SHIPPERS (oversea)

Ornstein & Co.	93,938	—	93,938
McKinley Schmidt & Co.	57,609	—	57,609
Pinto & Co.	29,813	—	29,813
Theodor Wille & Co.	38,550	44,713	83,263
Louis Boher & Co.	23,250	—	23,250
Arbuckle & Co.	17,550	69,279	86,829
Hard, Band & Co.	19,152	77,581	96,733
Norton Megaw & Co.	14,925	—	14,925
Gastro Silva & Co.	21,885	—	21,885
Stolle Emerson & Co.	12,930	2,508	15,438
Eugen Urban & Co.	12,422	70,105	82,527
Pinheiro & Ladeira	5,120	—	5,120
Comp. Prado Chaves	4,856	149,169	154,025
Carlo Pareto & Co.	3,500	—	3,500
McLaughlin & Co.	2,726	4,400	7,126
Karl Valnis	2,000	—	2,000
Roberto Schoenn & Co.	1,955	—	1,955
Bauch & Co.	1,470	—	1,470
Augusto Leivine	1,000	—	1,000
Dauch & Co.	1,018	16,591	17,609
Diebold & Co.	871	—	871
Michaelsen Wright & Co.	559	27,405	27,964
Dias Garcia & Co.	500	—	500
Brazilian Warrants Company	1,114	—	1,114
Hermann Baasch	297	—	297
Sequeira & Co.	150	—	150
Belli & Co.	50	—	50
Rodrigues Alves Toledo & Co.	—	116,488	116,488
Naumann Gepp & Co.	—	99,995	99,995
Whitaker Brotero & Co.	—	72,291	72,291
Levy & Co.	—	73,565	73,565
Leon Israel & Bros	—	79,525	79,525
Ed. Johnston & Co.	—	79,302	79,302
S. A. Martinelli	—	44,216	44,216
Société F. Breslienne	—	46,849	46,849
Leme Ferreira & Co.	—	30,824	30,824
Nioao & Co.	—	26,990	26,990
J. Aron & Co.	—	25,500	25,500
G. Trinks & Co.	—	23,818	23,818
Nossack & Co.	—	22,025	22,025
Diebold & Co.	—	20,379	20,379
Comp. Krusche	—	13,500	13,500
Schmid Trost & Co.	—	7,658	7,658
Pughisi & Co.	—	9,054	9,054
Ganbá & Co.	—	5,000	5,000
Rahpaal Sampaio & Co.	—	4,000	4,000
Malta & Co.	—	3,575	3,575
J. Lucel & Co.	—	2,864	2,864
J. Jorge Figueiredo & Co.	—	2,651	2,651
Nette & Santos	—	3,358	3,358
The S. Paulo Coffee Estates	—	3,350	3,350
Geo. W. Ennor	—	2,940	2,940
Ind. R. F. Matarazzo	—	2,000	2,000
Fratelli Fuzelli	—	1,300	1,300
Campos & Co.	—	1,001	1,001
D. Orey & Co.	—	1,000	1,000
J. B. Sourachio	—	1,000	1,000
Aquirra & Co.	—	461	461
A. C. Prado	—	400	400
F. Matarazzo & Co.	—	376	376
F. Lima Nogueira & Co.	—	523	523
Sundry	2,223	3,813	6,036

371,403 1,284,263 1,655,666

Per shippers (coastwise)

Eugen Urban & Co.	5,792	—	5,792
Ornstein & Co.	4,628	—	4,628
Theodor Wille & Co.	3,990	—	3,990
Gastro Silva & Co.	2,430	—	2,430
Stolle Emerson & Co.	2,258	—	2,258
Sequeira & Co.	1,813	—	1,813
Roberto Schoenn & Co.	1,765	—	1,765
Mc. K. Schmidt & Co.	1,095	—	1,095
Taneredo Porto	200	—	200
Zenha Ramos & Co.	199	—	199
Pinheiro & Ladeira	195	—	195
Louis Boher & Co.	20	—	20
Pinto & Co.	23	—	23
Sundry	266	177	443

Total coastwise 24,675 177 24,852  
Total overseas 371,403 1,284,263 1,655,666

Grand total 396,078 1,284,440 1,680,518

PER SHIPPING COMPANIES

Johnson Line	77,971	111,661	189,632
Lloyd Brasileiro	64,351	188,952	253,303
Various English Lines	55,055	179,660	234,715
T. Maritimes	49,019	52,827	101,846
Chargeurs Reunis	28,120	67,035	95,155
Lloyd Real Hollandez	19,994	239,737	259,731
Lampport and Holt	26,811	40,975	67,786
Various Danish Lines	19,668	37,420	57,088
Royal Mail	7,812	70,623	78,435
U.S. & Brazil Steamship Co.	7,530	70,729	78,259

Lloyd Italiano	5,833	24,375	30,208
N. G. Italiana	4,180	18,511	22,691
N. Italia	1,569	19,735	21,304
Sud. Atlantique	1,505	5,278	6,783
Comp. Transatlantica de Barcelona	1,475	2,691	4,066
Norwegian South American Line	600	2,411	3,011
Comp. Com. Navegacao	—	85,334	85,334
Transatlantica Italiana	—	33,573	33,573
Prince Line	—	31,367	31,367
Lloyd Sabando	—	1,463	1,463
Lloyd del Pacifico	—	5	5
Pinillos Izquierdo & Co.	—	1	1
Lloyd Brasileiro (coastwise)	11,620	177	11,797
Navegacao Casteira	8,503	—	8,503
Comp. Comercio Navegacao	4,172	—	4,172
Koepke	380	—	380
Grand total	395,078	1,284,440	1,680,518

PER DESTINATIONS.		PER SHIPPERS.	
United States	710,729	Brazilian	491,891
Holland	256,743	German and Austrian	419,460
France and Colonies	215,777	American	294,995
Sweden	158,464	British	236,727
Italy and Colonies	107,366	Doubtful	140,976
Great Britain & Colonies	62,147	French	48,849
Denmark	57,588	Italian	21,768
Norway	27,025	Swedish	1,000
Greece	22,000		
Egypt	19,700		1,655,666
South America	14,131	Coastwise	24,852
Spain and Colonies	2,741		
Portugal and Colonies	1,255		1,680,518
	1,655,666		
Coastwise	24,852		
	1,680,518		

## PER SHIPPING COMPANIES.

British	412,303
Brazilian	338,619
Dutch	259,641
French	203,784
Swedish	189,632
Italian	107,776
American	78,259
Danish	57,088
Spanish	5,553
Norwegian	3,011
	1,655,666
Coastwise	24,852
	1,680,518

## CURRENT COFFEE FREIGHT RATES.

February 15th, 1915.

(Per 1,000 kilos in full if not otherwise stated.)

Alexandretta	155.50 frs.
Alexandria	155.50 frs.
Algiers	152.50 frs.
Alicante	162.50 frs.
Almeria	162.50 frs.
Amsterdam	105/- & 5% (cargo boats) 125/- & 5% (mail)
Ancona	149.50 frs.
Barcelona	152.50 frs.
Bassorah	200.50 frs.
Batoum	167.50 frs.
Bergen	112/- in full
Beyrouth	155.00 frs.
Bilbao	167.50 frs.
Braila	167.50 frs.
Brindisi	149.50 frs.
Buenos Aires, per bag	18500
Cadiz	167.50 frs.
Carthagena	167.50 frs.
Cavalla	167.50 frs.
Cesmeh	167.50 frs.
Christiania	112/- in full
Constantinople	150.50 frs.
Copenhagen	112/6 in full
Corfu	167.50 frs.
Coruna	110.00 frs.
Dakar	125.00 frs.
Dedeagatch	167.50 frs.
Galatz	167.50 frs.
Genoa	110.00 frs.
Gibraltar	125 frs. in full
Gijon	110.00 frs.
Gothenburg	111/- in full
Havre, per 900 kilos	125 frs & 10%
Huelva	110.00 frs.
Kustandje	167.50 frs.
Las Palmas	125.00 frs.
Liverpool	115/- & 5% (Mail boats only)
London and options	115/- & 5% (cargo boats) 135/- & 5% (mail)
Malaga	162.50 frs.

Malta	112/- in full
Malta	146.00 frs.
Marseilles	125.00 frs.
Mersina	155.00 frs.
Messina	143.00 frs.
Mytilene	167.50 frs.
Montevideo, per bag	18500
Mostaganem	152.50 frs.
Naples	140.50 frs.
New York, per bag	\$1.00 & 5% per bag
New Orleans, per bag	\$1.00 & 5% per bag
Odessa	155.00 frs.
Oran	152.50 frs.
Palermo	143.50 frs.
Patras	167.50 frs.
Piraeus	150.50 frs.
Port Said	155.00 frs.
Salonica	150.50 frs.
Samsoun	167.50 frs.
Santander	110.00 frs.
Sevilla	157.50 frs.
Smyna	150.50 frs.
Stockholm	111/- in full
Suez	155.00 frs.
Sulina	167.50 frs.
Tangier	155.50
Trebizonde	167.50 frs.
Tripoli (Syria)	155.00 frs.
Tripoli (Barbary)	146.00 frs.
Tunis	152.50 frs.
Valencia	157.50 frs.
Valparaiso	59 3 per ton
Varna	167.50 frs.
Venice	145.50 frs.
Vigo	110.00 frs.
Algoa Bay & Cape Town	60/-
Mossel Bay	60/-
East London	6/-
Durban	60/-
Delagoa Bay	8/-
Port Natal, via Southampton	70/-

## MONEY

Closing Rates were as follows:—

	90 days' Bank	Commercial	Sovs.
Saturday, 6th February	13 1-16	13 3-16	18\$400
Monday, 8th February	12 15-16	13 1-32	18\$500
Tuesday, 9th February	12 11-16	12 3/4	18\$600
Wednesday, 10th February	12 13-32	12 17-32	19\$000
Thursday, 11th February	12 9-16	12 11-16	18\$700
Friday, 12th February	12 11-16	12 13-16	19\$000
Saturday, 13th February	12 11-16	12 7-8	18\$000

Rio de Janeiro, February 13th, 1915.

Ninety days' rate on London closed this evening at 12 11-16d. to 12 3/4d., with money in the banks at 12 7-8d. The rate of 15d. for sales at the Bank of Brazil was maintained.

After a slight reaction on Friday, following the meeting at the Associação Commercial, the rate weakened, without any apparent reason, as both sales and embarques of coffee last week are larger than ever.

As was to be expected by anyone acquainted with the Minister of Finance, he does not seem likely to lend himself to the subterfuge proposed by the Associação Commercial, though not disinclined to consider an increase in the rate of interest that would make the proposed issue more attractive.

For the moment this issue is scarcely a factor of exchange, though bound to become one directly the Treasury commences actual delivery of the bonds, whether with function of legal tender or no.

It seems questionable, in view of the late proclamation prohibiting any participation whatsoever in foreign loans or flotations, whether even interest could be made payable in London. Anyhow it would be well to get this question settled before Government is compromised.

The creditors to whom these bonds will be delivered, not being in a position to hold them for revenue, will be obliged to dispose of them for what they may fetch. This, in an already overloaded market, seems bound to give rise to depreciation of the security

whilst the remittance of the proceeds abroad would give rise to a demand for bills, that the actual supply would be insufficient to satisfy.

Judging from the experience of the Paraguayan war, some well-informed persons believe that a 7 per cent. rate of interest for the paper is as and 6 per cent. for the gold would be attractive enough to stimulate investment seeing how much money is lying idle. The margin between the yield of the paper issue at 7 per cent. and of apolices is at actual quotations so narrow as to offer but slight inducement to investors. It is possible that the offer of gold apolices at 6 per cent. might be more effective, but the way that obligations of this kind have been lately treated is scarcely likely to inspire much confidence nor the fact that Government can even now only meet the service of apolices by fresh issues of paper money. Since the actual Government came into power, paper money to the amount of about Rs. 30,000,000\$ have been issued, leaving on the 13th November only 4,100,000\$ to complete the authorised issue of 250,000 contos.

The worst of the situation is the desperate condition of exports, threatened in many instances with extinction unless prices react abroad or expenses be reduced.

Pará rubber has dropped within the last week from 80 to 50 cents, whilst freight rates from that neighbourhood must be almost, if not absolutely, prohibitive for the lower grade qualities that compose so large a proportion of Amazon production.

The same is occurring with every other staple whose sterling prices have not responded to the increase in cost of transport and insurance.

Next coffee crop is going to be a big one and consumption extremely reduced by the blockade of German and Austrian ports.

Whatever may result for the remainder of the current produce season, prospects for the next cannot be regarded with equanimity, unless the war should stop or the general commercial situation experience in some other way an unlooked for improvement.

**Latest Quotations, February 13th:—**

	1915	1914
4 per cent., 1889 .....	54	100
Funding, 1914 .....	75	—
1910 4 per cent. ....	53½	73½
S. Paulo, 1888 .....	91½	97
S. Paulo, 1913 .....	89½	98½
Leopoldina stock .....	36½	74
S. Paulo Railway, Ordinary .....	190	242½
Traction Ordinary .....	51	92
Brazil Railway .....	7	32
Dumont Coffee Co., Ltd. ....	8½	10
Consols .....	68½	76½
Federal Apolices or 5 per cent. Int. Bonds 800\$		
Gold Vales .....	15d.	

**Ratio of cash to Deposits at Call and discounts in the Banco do Brasil and principal foreign banks in Rio de Janeiro on 31st January, 1915:—**

	Deposits at Call	Cash	Ratio	Discounts
Banco do Brazil .....	111,038,246\$	27,126,743\$	24.4%	35,704,240\$
London and Brazilian .....	12,430,539\$	12,764,819\$	102.7%	1,682,517\$
London and River Plate .....	15,119,863\$	8,888,199\$	58.8%	1,364,287\$
British of South America .....	16,323,796\$	18,757,560\$	114.9%	4,642,874\$
Brasilianische fur Dd. ....	8,737,964\$	10,088,325\$	115.5%	4,187,676\$
Allemao Transatlantico .....	3,923,279\$	5,639,707\$	143.7%	1,104,165\$
Banco Germanico .....	2,788,440\$	3,751,816\$	134.5%	1,659,149\$
<b>Total, 31st January, 1915</b> .....	<b>170,362,127\$</b>	<b>87,017,159\$</b>	<b>50.8%</b>	<b>50,344,908\$</b>
<b>Total, 31st December, 1914</b> .....	<b>150,645,866\$</b>	<b>93,851,543\$</b>	<b>60.3%</b>	<b>51,788,013\$</b>
<b>Total, 30th November, 1914</b> .....	<b>165,908,950\$</b>	<b>93,495,061\$</b>	<b>56.3%</b>	
<b>Total, 31st October, 1914</b> .....	<b>160,081,961\$</b>	<b>83,081,961\$</b>	<b>51.9%</b>	
<b>Total, 30th September, 1914</b> .....	<b>179,008,350\$</b>	<b>90,918,778\$</b>	<b>50.8%</b>	
<b>Total, 31st August, 1914</b> .....	<b>185,347,846\$</b>	<b>72,316,057\$</b>	<b>39.0%</b>	
<b>Total, 31st July, 1914</b> .....	<b>155,019,985\$</b>	<b>72,316,356\$</b>	<b>46.4%</b>	

**RUBBER**

**RUBBER EXPORTS, AUGUST-DECEMBER.**

	1913		1914		Inc. or Dec. Tons
	Quantity Tons	Value £	Quantity Tons	Value £	
Great Britain .....	5,057	1,336,752	3,328	663,064	-1,729
United States .....	6,431	1,499,568	8,563	1,607,792	+2,132
France .....	1,194	327,167	96	15,630	-1,098
Germany .....	297	67,006	—	—	-297
Belgium .....	29	7,400	—	—	-29
Cape of Good Hope .....	2	375	—	—	-2
Italy .....	—	—	36	6,592	+36
Paraguay, Argentina & Uruguay in transit .....	53	14,073	49	8,099	-4
<b>5 months, Aug.-Dec.</b> .....	<b>13,063</b>	<b>3,252,341</b>	<b>12,072</b>	<b>2,301,177</b>	<b>-991</b>
<b>7 months, Jan.-July</b> .....	<b>22,241</b>	<b>7,123,053</b>	<b>20,454</b>	<b>4,743,823</b>	<b>-1,787</b>
<b>Total for year</b> .....	<b>35,304</b>	<b>10,375,394</b>	<b>32,526</b>	<b>7,045,000</b>	<b>-2,778</b>

For the whole year 1914 exports show a decrease in volume of 2,778 tons or 7.8 per cent. compared with 1913. For the 1st 7 months previous to the war the shrinkage was 1,787 tons or 8 per cent., and for the five months, Aug.-Dec., the decrease was 991 tons or 7.7 per cent. During this period exports to the United States took a considerable spurt, showing an increase of 2,132 tons or 33 per cent. compared with last year, whilst those to Great Britain fell off 1,098 tons or 34 per cent., in consequence chiefly of the embargo on exports from Great Britain and Colonies. Exports to France were nearly nominal, in consequence of the suspension of direct navigation. A small trade that was springing up with Italy was still born owing to the seizure of the rubber by the British authorities at Gibraltar as contraband.

There was a shrinkage of 4 tons compared with last year in exports via Argentina, Montevideo and Paraguay in transit.

There were, of course, no direct exports to Germany, Austria or Belgium. In fact, direct exports to these countries never seem to have been very large and did not exceed 622 tons out of a total of 35,304 tons for the whole of 1913; most of the trade in Pará rubber with the Continent having always been done through Liverpool.

The total value of rubber exported for the twelve months Jan.-Dec., 1914, was £7,045,000, or an average of £217 per ton as compared with £10,375,394 or £293 per ton for 1913.

For the first seven months Jan.-July, 1914, the aggregate value was £4,743,823 or £231 per ton as compared with £7,123,053 or £320 per ton for 1913 and for the post-bellum period August-December, 1914, £2,301,177 or £190 per ton as compared with £3,252,341 or £248 per ton for same period 1913.

With the exception of the small quantity (36 tons) shipped in December to Italy from Rio and 9 tons shipped in transit via Montevideo, Argentina and Paraguay, to destinations unknown, no rubber has been shipped direct from Brazil to any country besides the United Kingdom, U.S.A. and France.

Though comparatively so near, Amazonia might be at the uttermost ends of the earth for all that we know about its goings on. Occasionally prices are quoted in the "Jornal do Comercio," but very erratically.

We have now made arrangements for a weekly telegram giving prices of hard fine in sterling in London and in currency at Pará. On 11th February Hard fine was quoted at New York at 58½c., as against 80c. only a few weeks ago and Ilhas at Pará were quoted at 2\$450; sertão (or hard fine) 3\$400 and caucho, 2\$500.

## SHIPPING

### VESSELS ARRIVING AT THE PORT OF RIO DE JANEIRO DURING THE WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 11th, 1915.

- Jan. 4.—TOCANTINS, Brazilian s.s. 25500 tons, from Mossoró  
4.—PETREL, Brazilian s.s. 327 tons, from Rio Grande  
4.—S. J. DA BARRA, Brazilian s.s. 230 tons, from S. Mathews  
4.—ARAQUARA, Brazilian s.s. 1466 tons, from Santos  
4.—ITAQUERA, Brazilian s.s. 1254 tons, from Porto Alegre  
4.—BAHIA, Brazilian s.s. 2084 tons, from Mandos  
4.—BRUSQUE, Brazilian lugger 261 tons, from Itajahy  
4.—PROVENCE, French s.s. 2480 tons, from Santos  
4.—DENBIGHSHIRE, British s.s. 2489 tons, from Santos  
5.—P. DE MORAES, Brazilian s.s. 497 tons, from Florianopolis  
6.—MOSKOV, Danish s.s. 1490 tons, from Santos  
5.—ALGERIE, French s.s. 2539 tons, from Marseilles  
5.—LEON XIII, Spanish s.s. 2721 tons, from Bilbao  
5.—INDIANA, Italian s.s. 3051 tons, from Genoa  
5.—INDIANA, Italian s.s. 3951 tons, from Genoa  
6.—MARGARET, Swedish s.s. 701 tons, from Santos  
6.—ROMANO, Brazilian lugger, 40 tons, from Itajahy  
5.—A. CHARNER, French s.s. 2873 tons, from Havre  
6.—QUADROS, Brazilian tug, 60 tons, from Cabo Frio  
6.—INCA, British s.s. 2322 tons, from Arica  
6.—CABO FRIO, Brazilian lugger, 35 tons, from Cabo Frio  
7.—TATINGA, Brazilian s.s. 1181 tons, from Pernambuco  
7.—SIRIO, Brazilian s.s. 930 tons, from Montevideo  
7.—DESEADO, British s.s. 7295 tons, from Liverpool  
7.—FERNGARTH, British s.s. 2699 tons, from Bahia Blanca  
7.—RUPERT, British s.s. 2693 tons, from Bahia Blanca  
7.—IRIS, Brazilian s.s. 899 tons, from Santos  
8.—PIRANGY, Brazilian s.s. 950 tons, from Santos  
8.—ITAPERUNA, Brazilian s.s. 713 tons, from Ilhéos  
9.—TUBANTIA, Dutch s.s. 8561 tons, from Amsterdam  
9.—RIO COLORADO, British s.s. 2257 tons, from New York  
9.—DAWLISH, British s.s. 2216 tons, from Buenos Aires  
9.—BURSK, British s.s. 2693 tons, from Newport  
9.—F. NANSEN, Norwegian s.s. 1323 tons, from South Joaquim  
9.—M. FERARA, British s.s. 7292 tons, from Buenos Aires  
10.—P. MAFALDA, Italian s.s. 5067 tons, from Genoa  
10.—SPENCER, British s.s. 2045 tons, from Glasgow  
10.—ITAPUCA, Brazilian s.s. 978 tons, from Porto Alegre  
11.—ASSU, Brazilian s.s. 789 tons, from Porto Alegre  
11.—TROPPEIRO, Brazilian s.s. 978 tons, from Santos  
11.—URANO, Brazilian s.s. 141 tons, from Santos  
11.—FALLODEN, British s.s. 1914 tons, from Glasgow

### VESSELS SAILING FROM THE PORT OF RIO DE JANEIRO DURING THE WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 11th, 1915.

- Feb. 4.—VENECOR, Brazilian lugger, 27 tons, for Cabo Frio  
4.—GAMA II, Brazilian lugger, 64 tons, for Cabo Frio  
4.—SALERNO, Norwegian s.s. 1150 tons, for Santos  
4.—SCHEIDER, Dutch tug, 37 tons, for Buenos Aires  
4.—CLOUGHTON, British s.s. 2502 tons, for Bahia Blanca  
5.—ITAJUBA, Brazilian s.s. 758 tons, for Pelotas  
5.—IRIS, Brazilian s.s. 989 tons, for Santos  
5.—INCA, British s.s. 2322 tons, for Liverpool  
5.—DESEADO, British s.s. 7295 tons, for Buenos Aires  
6.—LEON XIII, Spanish s.s. 2721 tons, for Buenos Aires  
6.—ITAPERMA, Brazilian s.s. 825 tons, for Porto Alegre  
6.—INDIANA, Italian s.s. 30551 tons, for Buenos Aires  
6.—SUL AMERICA, Brazilian tug, 60 tons, for Cabo Frio  
6.—PLANETA, Brazilian s.s. 253 tons, for Florianopolis  
6.—URANO, Brazilian s.s. 141 tons, for Santos  
6.—FLORES, Dutch s.s. 2813 tons, for Amsterdam  
6.—PYRINEUS, Brazilian s.s. 1044 tons, for Antonina  
6.—DEMERARA, British s.s. 7292 tons, for Liverpool  
6.—DENBIGHSHIRE, British s.s. 2489 tons, for Havre  
7.—ITAQUERA, Brazilian s.s. 1254 tons, for Parahyba  
7.—ITAPAVA, Brazilian s.s. 701 tons, for Caracaju  
7.—MINAS GERAES, Brazilian s.s. 2179 tons, for Santos  
7.—DESEADO, British s.s. 7295 tons, for Buenos Aires  
7.—TROPPEIRO, Brazilian s.s. 789 tons, for Santos  
7.—TUPY, Brazilian s.s. 1786 tons, for Santos  
8.—MAVRINK, Brazilian s.s. 375 tons, for Caravellas  
8.—BERTRAM, British s.s. 2282 tons, for Santa Fé  
8.—DALMATA, Argentine s.s. 1135 tons, for Bahia Blanca  
8.—PROVENCE, French s.s. 2480 tons, for Marseilles  
8.—RUPERT, British s.s. 2693 tons, from S. Vicente  
8.—FERNGATE, British s.s. 2899 tons, for S. Vicente  
9.—ARAQUARA, Brazilian s.s. 1466 tons, for Pernambuco  
9.—DAWLISH, British s.s. 2216 tons, for Las Palmas  
9.—TUBANTIA, Dutch s.s. 8561 tons, for Buenos Aires  
9.—MOSKOV, Danish s.s. 1490 tons, for Copenhagen  
9.—QUADROS, Brazilian s.s. 60 tons, for Cabo Frio  
9.—MARGARET, Swedish s.s. 701 tons, for Gothenburg  
9.—BRASIL, Norwegian s.s. 1416 tons, for Rio Grande  
9.—A. CHARNER, French s.s. 2873 tons, for Buenos Aires  
10.—CEARA, Brazilian s.s. 2078 tons, for Manáas  
10.—TATINGA, Brazilian s.s. 1181 tons, for Porto Alegre  
10.—P. MAFALDA, Italian s.s. 5087 tons, for Buenos Aires  
10.—ALGERIE, French s.s. 2539 tons, for Marseilles  
10.—ITAPERUNA, Brazilian s.s. 713 tons, for Pelotas  
10.—QUEENMOOR, British s.s. 2409 tons, for Montevideo  
10.—BURESK, British s.s. 2409 tons, for Port Stanley  
10.—F. NANSEN, Norwegian s.s. 1323 tons, for Las Palmas  
11.—TOCANTINS, Brazilian s.s. 2500 tons, for Santos  
11.—ARAQUARA, Brazilian s.s. 650 tons, for Penedo  
11.—MUANSA, German s.s. 3373 tons, for Buenos Aires

### VESSELS ARRIVING AT THE PORT OF SANTOS

DURING THE WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 11th, 1915.

- Feb. 3.—ORION, Brazilian s.s. 540 tons, from Rio  
4.—ITAPUHY, Brazilian s.s. 926 tons, from Rio  
5.—ITAUNA, Brazilian s.s. 403 tons, from Rio  
5.—R. DE LA PLATA, Norwegian s.s. 1527 tons, from Christiania  
6.—ASSU, Brazilian s.s. 779 tons, from Porto Alegre  
6.—SIRIO, Brazilian s.s. 554 tons, from Porto Alegre  
5.—IRIS, Brazilian s.s. 807 tons, from Penedo  
6.—SALERNO, Norwegian s.s. 1398 tons, from Christiania  
6.—TOCANA, Italian s.s. 3538 tons, from Buenos Aires  
7.—ITAUBA, Brazilian s.s. 859 tons, from Aracaju  
7.—INDIANA, Italian s.s. 3051 tons, from Genoa  
7.—LEON XIII, Spanish s.s. 2720 tons, from B'lbao  
7.—FLORES, Dutch s.s. 2812 tons, from Amsterdam  
8.—URANO, Brazilian s.s. 192 tons, from Rio  
8.—PLANETA, Brazilian s.s. 253 tons, from Rio  
8.—MINAS GERAES, Brazilian s.s. 1643 tons, from New York  
8.—RIJNLAND, Dutch s.s. 3538 tons, from Amsterdam  
8.—TIBAGY, Brazilian s.s. 834 tons, from Rio  
8.—D. ESEADO, British s.s. 7295 tons, from Liverpool  
8.—ABYSSINIA, Norwegian s.s. 1936 tons, from Gulf Port  
8.—TROPPEIRO, Brazilian s.s. 548 tons, from Rio  
9.—ITAPUCA, Brazilian s.s. 839 tons, from Porto Alegre  
9.—R. ELENA, Italian s.s. 4332 tons, from Buenos Aires  
10.—P. DI UDINE, Italian s.s. 4935 tons, from Genoa  
10.—TUBANTIA, Dutch s.s. 8561 tons, from Amsterdam  
10.—A. CHARNER, French s.s. 2883 tons, from Havre

### VESSELS SAILING FROM THE PORT OF SANTOS

DURING THE WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 11th, 1915.

- Feb. 4.—MOSKOV, Danish s.s. 1490 tons, for Copenhagen  
4.—ITAPUHY, Brazilian s.s. 926 tons, for Porto Alegre  
4.—STRABO, British s.s. 3871 tons, for Buenos Aires  
4.—ORION, Brazilian s.s. 540 tons, for Montevideo  
4.—MARGARET, Swedish s.s. 701 tons, for Stockholm  
4.—ABYSSINIA, British s.s. 2628 tons, for Montevideo  
5.—ITAUNA, Brazilian s.s. 403 tons, for Porto Alegre  
6.—POSTEIRO, Brazilian s.s. 840 tons, for Porto Alegre  
6.—PIRANGY, Brazilian s.s. 750 tons, for Manáas  
6.—SIRIO, Brazilian s.s. 554 tons, for Rio  
6.—IRIS, Brazilian s.s. 894 tons, for Rio  
6.—TOCANA, Italian s.s. 3539 tons, for Genoa  
7.—R. DE LA PLATA, Norwegian s.s. 1527 tons, for B. Aires  
7.—INDIANA, Italian s.s. 3852 tons, for Buenos Aires  
7.—LEON XIII, Spanish s.s. 2720 tons, for Buenos Aires  
7.—ITAUBA, Brazilian s.s. 859 tons, for Pelotas  
8.—URANO, Brazilian s.s. 192 tons, for Rio  
8.—PLANETA, Brazilian s.s. 253 tons, for Iguape  
8.—DESEADO, British s.s. 7295 tons, for Buenos Aires  
9.—ASSU, Brazilian s.s. 779 tons, for Manáas  
9.—TROPPEIRO, Brazilian s.s. 548 tons, for Gibraltar  
9.—ITAPUCA, Brazilian s.s. 839 tons, for Rio  
9.—SALERNO, Norwegian s.s. 1398 tons, for Buenos Aires  
9.—MINERVA, Argentine s.s. 422 tons, for Paranaguá  
9.—FLAND, British s.s. 2706 tons, for Buenos Aires  
9.—F. MATABAZZO, British s.s. 1779 tons, for Bsario  
10.—R. ELENA, Italian s.s. 3462 tons, for Genoa  
10.—P. DI UDINE, Italian s.s. 4935 tons, for Buenos Aires  
10.—TUBANTIA, Dutch s.s. 8561 tons, for Buenos Aires  
10.—A. CHARNER, French s.s. 2883 tons, for Buenos Aires

## The Week's Official War News

The following official commiqués have been received by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires:—

London, February 8th, 3.15 p.m.

The following statement is issued by the Foreign Office: The use of a neutral flag is, with certain limitations, well established in practice as a "ruse-de-guerre."

The only effect in the case of a merchantman, of wearing a flag other than her national flag, is to compel the enemy to follow the ordinary obligations of naval warfare, and to satisfy himself as to the nationality of the vessel and character of cargo by examination before capturing her and taking her into a Prize Court for adjudication.

The British Government has always considered the use of British colours by foreign vessels as legitimate for the purpose of escaping capture. Such practices not only involves no breach of international law, but is specifically recognised by the law of this country.

In the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, it is enacted as follows:—  
"If a person uses the British flag and assumes British national character on board a British ship owned in whole or in part by any persons not qualified to own a British ship, for the purpose of making the ship appear to be a British ship, the ship shall be subject to forfeiture under this Act, unless the assumption has been made for the purpose of escaping capture by an enemy or by a

foreign ship of war in exercise of some belligerent right," and in instructions to British Consuls, dated 1914, it is stated "a ship is liable to capture if British character is improperly assumed, except for the purposes of escaping capture."

As we have in practice not objected to foreign merchant vessels using the British flag as a ruse for the purpose of evading capture at sea at the hands of a belligerent, so we should maintain in the converse case a British merchant vessel committed no breach of international law in assuming neutral colours for a similar purpose, if she thought fit to do so.

By the rules of international law, the customs of war and the dictates of humanity, it is obligatory upon a belligerent to ascertain the character of a merchant vessel and of her cargo before capture.

Germany has no right to disregard this obligation.

To destroy the ship, non-combatant crew, and cargo, as Germany has announced her intention of doing, is nothing less than an act of piracy on the high seas.

London, February 9th, 1.10 p.m.

Following is a summary of Russian official communiqué from February 5th to 8th:—

In East Prussia Germans received reinforcements and fighting became very fierce in the valleys of Inster and Shessupa, the Germans being repulsed and driven from several villages.

In Northern Poland fighting is developing in region of Sierpe and encounters have taken place on frontiers towards the Masurian Lakes.

In Central Poland the violent German attack against the Russian positions on the front of the Bzura and Rawka rivers continued, but they were defeated, and the Russians, taking the offensive, crossed the Bzura and took enemy position to south of Sochaczew and also captured two lines of German trenches near Borzimoff. On 7th the Russians continued this advance and captured an important point d'appui near the village of Kamion on the western bank of the Bzura.

In Southern Poland various enemy attacks were easily repulsed.

In the Carpathians the Russians have everywhere been successful and have taken large numbers of prisoners at many points. The German forces which had crossed the Beskid and Tulkolka passes on 5th were thrown back with heavy losses. In the Uszek pass the Russian offensive continues and more than 3,000 prisoners have been taken. Between January 26th and February 5th the Russian troops operating in the region of Meso Laborez captured more than 10,000 prisoners and many guns.

In Bukovina the Russians are falling back before superior enemy forces, but fighting was favourable to Russians, who took 1,000 prisoners on 4th.

London, February 9th, 1.40 p.m.

Following official communiqué was issued at Cairo yesterday:

The losses suffered by the enemy in their attack upon the Canal were heavier than at first supposed. It is difficult to estimate the number of killed amongst the enemy owing to the wide area over which the action extended, but over 500 killed, including six drowned in the canal, have now been found and buried by our patrols. There were 652 prisoners, 100 of whom were wounded. Deserters still continue to come in. Four Turks who were reported to have crossed the Canal have now given themselves up. The Turkish Army is in full retreat towards the East and there are now no enemy forces within twenty miles of the Canal. Even at that distance there are only small rearguard forces which are retiring steadily eastwards. This retreat is probably due both to discouragement of troops at their defeat on 2nd-3rd February and to lack of water in western part of Sini desert. Whether they will so far recover their morale as to attempt a second attack on the Canal cannot as yet be determined.

Shiek Sidi Asmed Gorand Senussi in conversation with a British official, expressed great annoyance in that certain people had spread baseless reports in regard to his intentions and thus thrown doubt on his pledged word of friendship towards Egypt and

its Government. Suliman El Baruni, a well known Tripoli agitator and others who discovered intriguing against Egypt, have been arrested by the Senussi.

London, February 9th, 5.15 p.m.

Admiralty has published reports of the masters of the British ships "Ikaria" and "Tokomaru," which were torpedoed by German submarines.

The "Ikaria" was on voyage from Brazil to Havre and London, when on January 31st at a point to the northwest of Havre, the ship was struck by a torpedo and began to sink. The only warning was the sight of the torpedo rail when 30 feet from the ship. The ship was, however, towed into Havre.

The "Tokomaru" was on voyage from New Zealand to Havre and was also struck by a torpedo near Havre, entirely without warning. The master sighted a periscope and thus established the cause of the disaster. The ship sank immediately. The crew were saved by a French mine-sweeper.

The British ship "Oriole" is missing since January 30th. bound to Havre. There is grave reason to fear that she was also sunk by a German submarine with the loss of all hands, as life-buoys marked "Oriole" have been washed up at Rye, Sussex.

London, February 12th, 2.20 p.m.

Following is a summary of Russian official communiqué from Feb. 9th to 11th:—

In East Prussia the Germans have concentrated large forces and on 7th passed to offensive. Russians are falling back from Masurian Lakes but are holding the enemy.

In North Poland only minor engagements have taken place.

In Central Poland calm prevails. To judge from bodies found before Russian positions Germans seem to have lost tens of thousands of men during the course of the six day's attack upon the Russian positions at Borzimow, Gumini and Wela Sydowska.

In the Carpathians the Russians are pressing the enemy in the Dukla, Lupkow and Uszek Passes, where they have taken several thousand prisoners. On one day in the Lupkow Pass the Russians took 69 officers, 5,200 men and 18 machine guns. On 7th the German forces crossed Tucholka Pass and made 22 violent attacks on Russian positions on heights of Kozigna. Irresistible German advance made in massed formation twice carried heights, but Russians drove enemy back after unprecedented bayonet fighting. In front of one Russian battalion 1,000 German dead were counted and Germans were utterly exhausted. On 10th the Russians repulsed a further attack against this position and also captured the heights of Rabe to the east of Lupkow Pass, together with 1,000 prisoners.

In the Black Sea, the "Breslau" bombarded Yalta and Russian destroyers shelled Trebizond batteries, destroying bridges and sinking over 50 enemy sailing vessels.

London February 12th, 8.50 p.m.

Admiralty makes following announcement: ¼

During last 24 hours combined aeroplane and seaplane operations have been carried out by naval wing in Bruges, Zeebrugge, Blankenberghe and Ostende districts with a view to preventing the development of submarine bases and establishments. 34 naval aeroplanes and seaplanes took part. Great damage reported done to Ostend railway station, which, according to present information, has probably been burnt to the ground. Railway station at Blankenberghe damaged and railway lines torn up in many places. Bombs dropped on gun positions at Middelkerke and on power station and German mine sweeping vessels at Zeebrugge, but damage done unknown. No submarines were seen.

Flight Commander Grahame White fell into the sea off Nieuport and was rescued although exposed to heavy gun fire from rifles, aircraft guns and mitrailleuses, etc. All pilots safe. Two machines damaged.

Seaplanes and aeroplanes were under command of Commander Samson.